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THE MODERN IDEAL OF CULTURE 
A definition of modern culture as something realised and 
actual ought not to be too elusive, especially as it can be spoken 
of in concrete terms. It is possible to point to certain men and 
say, "There are cultivated men; the qualities they possess evi-
dently go to make up culture. " By way of approach, suppose we 
recall Matthew Arnold's sentence: "Notwithstanding the mighty 
results of the Pilgrim Fathers' voyage, they and their standard 
of perfection are rightly judged when we figure to ourselves 
Shakespeare or Virgil-souls in whom sweetness and light, and 
all that in human nature is most humane, were eminent-accom-
panying them on their voyage, and think what intolerable com-
pany Shakespeare and Virgil would have found them!" 
Now, if Shakespeare and Virgil would have found the Pilgrim 
Fathers intolerable-and I dare say they might have so found 
them-would it not be expedient in illustration of modem culture 
to take those poets out of that boat and put other men there who 
would have loved Shakespeare and Virgil and who would not 
have found the Pilgrim Fathers intolerable? Here is a para-
graph laden with such men: 
.. Apt scholars find great teachers. Early in life Mr. Wilson chose his 
with the confidence of natural kinship. All alike were scholars and all men 
of affairs-a noble roster to which he refers with esteem and gratitude. There 
were John Stuart Mill who had hammered out his theories in the House of 
Commons; Morley, famous in statecraft, and prince of biographers in our 
time; De Tocqueville, who learned his wisdom among men; the worldly-wise 
authors of The Federalist; the inimitable Bagehot, who drew his knowledge 
from the counting-house and the working machine of the British Constitu-
tion; and an • arrow's flight beyond them all' Burke, who ploughed his phi-
losophy with experience and reaped experience from his philosophy. A differ-
ent school is theirs from the closet theories of Montesquieu, of Spencer, of 
Rousseau, and of Hume, differing by half a world; and at this school where 
theory is squared to the unbending practices of men, Mr. Wilson has been a 
life student." 
Mill, Morley, De Tocqueville, Bagehot-it is such men as 
these that should be accredited with sufficient breadth of sym-
pathy to appreciate at once Shakespeare, Virgil, and the Pilgrim 
Fathers, and, at a venture, a few other people and things besides. 
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These are typical men of modern culture. There might be added 
a scientist, von Humboldt, most versatile of men; or a man of 
letters, Sir Leslie Stephen, a prince of the short biography; or 
a poet, even Milton, say, "an arrow's flight beyond them all." 
But in choosing men from these various activities, it is precisely 
the field of work that I should not care to emphasise-rather, the 
type of mind. And I have already indicated one quality that 
goes to make up this type-breadth of sympathy. That and one 
other quality, intellectual energy, form the equipment of the 
modern man of culture. If, then, we insist that men of culture 
nowadays possess this equipment, best, of course, in a superlative 
degree, like Mill, Morley, Bagehot, Stephen, I think we shall 
succeed in making the word culture take on a definiteness of 
meaning. So a poet, a man of religion, a scientist, an artist, or a 
statesman mayor may not be a man of culture; there are plenty 
of chances of his making definite contributions to human welfare 
and at the same time remaining narrow-minded. But it is the 
part of a cultivated man in modern times to appreciate poetry, 
religion, science, art, and statecraft, or at least to have a profound 
and abiding sympathy with all these activities, and at the same 
time be an intellectual and spiritual leader. 
But this realised or actual culture, as I have called it, is based, 
naturally, upon ideal conceptions which like the ideal conceptions 
of religion remain as visions, unattainable, never to be arrived 
at, and yet to be striven toward as a worthy goal. It is of this 
ideal conception I wish now to speak and, if I may, to note some 
changes that have, in fairly modern times, come over it. 
The western world, our world, derives avowedly a large share 
of its conception of culture from the Greeks. Whether or not 
this people had the word culture does not much matter, so in-
tense and so apparently instinctive was their practice of the thing 
itself. Culture, by almost any definition, was part and parcel of 
their theory of right living. I wish to touch briefly and of course 
superficially upon their theory, but in doing so shall not hesitate 
to avail myself of criticisms of it, in order to indicate how a 
modern culture cannot possibly be a sheer imitation of an older 
one. Here is perhaps the worst that can be said of the Greeks, 
a leaf from the pen of George Gissing: 
" It is idle to talk to us of 'The Greeks.' The people we mean when so 
naming them were a few little communities, living under very peculiar con-
ditions, and endowed by Nature with most exceptional characteristics. The 
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sporadic civilisation which we are too much in the habit of regarding as if it 
had been no less stable than brilliant was a succession of the briefest splen-
dours, gleaming here and there from the coasts of the .iEgea'n to those of the 
Western Mediterranean. Our heritage of Greek literature and art is price-
less; the example of Greek life possesses for us not the slightest value. The 
Greeks had nothing alien to study-not even a foreign or a dead language. 
They read hardly at all, preferring to listen. They were a slave-holding 
people, much given to social amusement, and hardly knowing what we call 
industry. Their ignorance was vast, their wisdom a grace of the gods. To-
gether with their fair intelligence, they had grave moral weaknesses. If we 
could see and speak with an average Athenian of the Periclean age, he would 
cause no little disappointment-there would be so much more of the bar-
barian in him, I and at the same time of the decadent, than we anticipated. More 
than possibly, even his physique would be a disillusion. Leave him in that old 
world, which is precious to the imagination of a few, but to the business and 
bosoms of the modern multitude irrelevant as Memphis or Babylon." 
Such a brilliant page is, perhaps, a fair offset to the conven-
tional encomiums weare accustomed to hear of the Athenian, 
encomiums which become possibly a bit wearisome, conventional, 
and extravagant. And yet I think we had better let an Athenian 
himself speak; here are the final words of that proud oration which 
Thucydides put into the mouth of Pericles: 
.. To sum up, I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the 
individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting 
himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and 
grace. This is no passing and idle word, but truth and fact; and the asser-
tion is verified by the position to which these qualities have raised the state. 
For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior 
to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the 
reverses which he sustains at the hands of such a city; no subject complai..'1s 
that his masters are unworthy of him. And we shall assuredly not be without 
witnesses; there are mighty monuments of our power which will make us 
the wonder of this and of succeeding ages; we shall not need the praises of 
Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose poetry may please for the moment, 
although his representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For 
we have compelled every land, every sea, to open a path for our valour, and 
have everywhere planted eternal 'memorials of our friendship and of our 
enmity." 
These words spring from a cultivated mind; they express, to 
be sure, by no means the most profound and endurable conception 
of culture we get from the Greeks, any more than the speaker 
was the most perfect embodiment of that conception. He is, 
however, spokesman of something which he considers ideal and 
I But compare Mattbew Arnold's essay, The Modern Element. 
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fine, and which evidently did not blossom forth overnight. The 
Greek citizen in the age of Pericles was at once a soldier and a 
politician; body and mind alike were at his country's service; 
and his whole ideal of conduct was inextricably bound up with 
his intimate and personal participation in public affairs. The 
Greek ideal for the individual life included the perfection of the 
body; beauty no less than goodness was the object of their quest, 
and they believed that the one implied the other. But since the 
perfection of the body required the co-operation of external aids, 
they made these also essential to their ideal. Not merely virtue 
of the soul, not merely health and beauty of the body, but noble 
birth, sufficient wealth, and a good name among men were 
included in their conception of the desirable life. Harmony, in a 
word, was the end they pursued, harmony of the soul with the 
body and of the body with its environment. The same ideal of 
harmony dominates the Greek view of the relation of the indi-
vidual to the state. The perfect individual was the individual in 
the state; the faculties essential to his excellence had there alone 
their opportunity of development; the qualities defined as virtues 
had there alone their significance; and it was only in so far as 
he was a citizen that a Greek was properly a man at all. 
Such was the Greek view of life, and such the Greek view of 
culture. To the Athenian life and culture were synonymous 
terms. In criticism of this conception may be quoted a sen-
tence or two from Lowes Dickinson: 
"With the Greek civilisation beauty perished from the world. Never 
again has it been possible for man to believe that harmony is in fact the truth 
of all existence. The intellect and the moral sense have developed impera-
tive claims which can be satisfied by no experience known to man. And as 
a consequence of this, the goal of desire which the Greeks could place in the 
present, has been transferred, for us, to a future infinitely remote, which never-
theless is conceived as attainable. Dissatisfaction with the world in which 
we live, and determination to realise one that shall be better, are the pre-
vailing characteristics of the modern spirit." 
So, if a group of men to-day were to take over bodily the Greek 
ideal of culture, they would find themselves isolated from the 
life about them. But here two questions rise in mind: in our 
modem definitions of culture, have we not been ready to discard 
much that we might have retained from the Greek ideal? sec-
ondly, in defining modem culture, must we not concede frankly 
that it is an isolated thing? My answer to both of these questions 
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will be implied in much that I say later; but I might observe now 
that of course culture is no longer synonymous with life. It is 
not even open to all free citizens. There should be in it nothing 
opposed to life, but there must be in it much that all lives cannot 
attain. We must, then, make the word culture mean something 
definite, something isolated, if you like, if we propose to employ 
the word at all. To be sure, since Matthew Arnold's day, no 
one thinks of not employing it. 
There are many reasons why Matthew Arnold should be 
called the Prophet of Culture. That, indeed, is what he aimed ' 
to be; his whole life was directed toward an understanding of the 
cultural ideal. To this end his environment was a most happy 
one. His father was a consummate schoolmaster, the head of an 
ideal home; Arnold associated constantly with the best sort of 
people-as favoured a class, I imagine, as the group of Athenians 
about Pericles. He was graduated with honours from the most 
scholarly college in Oxford; he became a fellow in that university 
and later professor of poetry. For thirty-five years he was 
inspector of schools. Everything he wrote savours of distinction, 
whether it be poetry, on education, on literature, on religion, or 
on politics. He was something of a linguist, an earnest student 
of philosophy and of history, though he was neither a philosopher 
nor a historian in the restricted meaning of these terms. Of 
science he knew next to nothing and with its claims he had little 
sympathy. His attitude on contemporary religious and political 
movements was that of ironical conservatism. 
I am in no position to attempt a sketch of Arnold's theory of 
culture; indeed, at the risk of seeming shallow, I propose just 
now to attack it at what appears to be its most vulnerable point, 
where perhaps he made his finest effort to popularise it-his 
book Culture and Anarchy and especially that notable chapter 
entitled" Sweetness and Light. " My attack, of course, will not 
be single-handed. I quote for a moment from Henry Sidgwick's 
admirable essay, The Prophet of Culture: 
"When we speak of culture and religion in common conversation, we 
sometimes refer to an ideal state of things, and sometimes to an actual. But 
if we are appraising, weighing, as it were, these two, one with the other, it is 
necessary to know whether it is the ideal or the actual that we are weighing. 
When I say ideal, I do not mean something that is not realised at all by in-
dividuals at present, but something not realised sufficiently to be much called 
to mind by the term denoting the general social fact. I think it clear that 
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Mr. Arnold, when he speaks of culture, is speaking sometimes of an ideal, 
sometimes of an actual culture, and does not always know which." 
Professor Sidgwick proceeds to substantiate this general 
stricture through a citation. For instance, Arnold describes 
culture in one page as "a study of perfection, moving by the force 
not merely or primarily of the scientific passion for pure know-
ledge, but of the moral and social passion for doing good." But 
in another page we find that this passion for doing good acts only 
in fine weather. "It needs," as Arnold affirms, "times of faith 
and ardour to flourish in." It is not evidently a spring and source 
of faith and ardour. Culture" believes" in making reason and 
the will of God prevail, but it must be under very favourable 
circumstances. "This," as Sidgwick says, "is rather a languid 
form of the passion of doing good; and we feel that we have passed 
from the ideal culture, towards which Mr. Arnold aspires, to the 
actual culture in which he lives and moves. " 
Ideally it is Arnold's wish that culture, taking ever wider and 
wider sweeps, shall carry the whole race, the whole universe 
harmoniously toward perfection. The Greek word EUq?u£a 
expresses to him this harmonious excellence. "The immense 
spiritual significance of the Greeks is due," he says, "to their 
having been inspired with this central and happy idea of the 
essential character of human perfection." "Greece did not err 
in having the idea of beauty, harmony, and complete human 
perfection so present and paramount. It is impossible to have 
this idea too present and paramount; only, .the moral fibre must 
be braced too." How to brace the moral fibre, Arnold suggests, 
inadvertently perhaps, when he says that culture must "borrow 
a devout energy" from religion; but devout energy, as Dr. New-
man somewhere points out, is not to be borrowed. If culture, 
then, is to lack enthusiasm or if its devotees are to have no 
sympathy with men of action, it is bound to degenerate into 
dilettanteism. The impulse toward perfection will remain, as it 
often does remain, a self-regarding desire for exquisite states of 
thought and feeling. 
This criticism of Arnold at his worst, I am pressing thus 
frankly because the chapter" Sweetness and Light" has been and 
is still, I doubt not, something of a stumbling-block in the way 
of a just interpretation of the modern cultural ideal. Arnold's 
dilemma, I should say, is something like this. He is in the act of 
bringing over to modern life the highest spiritual qualities of 
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Greek civilisation and is on the point of s~ying, "Accept these; 
these are culture," when, lo! there rises before him the apparition 
of Christianity. "To a world stricken with moral enervation, " 
he says, in a later chapter, "Christianity offered its spectacle of 
an inspired self-sacrifice." The dilemma is clear, is it not? 
Self-development, self-sacrifice. Here, to change the figure, 
are two roads, one leading apparently to religion, the other to 
culture. "The lesson must perforce be learned," Arnold con-
cludes in this later chapter, "the lesson must perforce be learned 
that the human spirit is wider than the most priceless of the 
forces which bear it onward, and that to the whole development 
of ':ri1an Hebraism itself is, like Hellenism, but a contribution." 
Suppose we should substitute for Hebraism another word, a 
word which Arnold possibly avoids-Christianity. Is Chris-
tianity but a contribution to the human spirit? Is it not rather 
the most significant fact in modern life? Or, if the word Chris-
tianity be troublesome, suppose the question stand, Is not the 
truth of self-sacrifice part of the very texture of modern life? If 
it is, and I assume your answer, then, if culture is also to hold a 
place in modern life, it must fall under life's conditions, one of 
them being self-sacrifice. 
I have no intention of pursuing a problem in ethics. I will, 
however, offer an illustration. A man is born in Florence, say, 
Florence of the late thirteenth century when she is alert to become 
the most cultured, the most Greek of all Italian cities, of all 
European cities. Giotto is there; and poetry and art and philo-
sophy are about to spring into new birth. This man is good to 
look upon; he delights in bodily exercise. He is of excellent 
family and of sufficient wealth. He is notable among the brilliant 
intellects there and is passionately fond of his city. Pericles 
could have pointed to such a man, and exclaimed, "Behold my 
ideal citizen!" 
But misfortunes come upon this man. His party loses control 
and he is banished from his city. For many years he wanders 
from place to place, climbing back stairs and eating the bread :of 
sorrow. As a young man, he had written; and now he keeps on 
writing, growing lean over his verses. He gives to the world ~a 
great poem, rare in expression, in philosophy, in observation. 
Yet Pericles could not have accepted that poem. ·It would have 
bewildered him; it is too instinct with a culture alien to his own. 
There is an antagonism which most of us endeavour in one 
THE MODERN IDEAL OF CULTURE 249 
way or another to reconcile, but which Matthew Arnold wrote 
upon with lack of sympathy and with possibly some little Phari-
saism, some little holding of the nostrils. Concerning these 
antagonisms, I return for a moment to Sidgwick: 
"The religious man tells himself," he says, "that in obeying the instinct 
of self-sacrifice he has chosen true culture, and the man of culture tells him-
self that by seeking self-development he is really taking the best course to 
'make reason and the will of God prevail.' But I do not think either is 
quite convinced. I think each dimly feels that it is necessary for the world 
that the other line of life should be chosen by some, and each and all look 
forward with yearning to a time when circumstances shall have become kinder 
and more pliable to our desires, and when the complex impulses of humanity 
that we share shall have been chastened and purified into something more 
easy to harmonise." 
If, then, I were to give a trial explanation of what the modern 
cultural ideal is, I should say that outwardly its distinctive fea-
tures are Greek; it involves an exercise, fine and complete, of all 
the powers of body, soul, and mind. But this outward ideal, if 
I may call it so, has on its road to us been fused and transformed 
into something tremendously inward, the meaning and end of 
which we cannot fully apprehend. Greek culture is static-it is a 
flower; it springs into bloom and then fades. Modern culture is 
an unceasing growth; its bloom is always to be, but never is. 
After Tolstoy, in his book What is Art? has told us that the 
highest mission of art is to usher in the reign of brotherly love, 
that insatiable soul adds this word: "Perhaps some day science 
will reveal to art an ideal still more exalted than that of brotherly 
love, and art will proceed to realise it." With this vision of 
science and art still biding their time, forever unappeased, I leave 
the discussion of modern culture as an ideal and return, in closing, 
to those leaders who I said were representatives of modern cul-
tural attainment. 
Their interests were various. Of Bagehot it is said he gave to 
literature energies which might have gained him a large fortune 
in business or a great position in the political world. His fav-
ourite studies in college were poetry, mathematics, and history. 
Mill devoted himself to chemistry, botany, and advanced mathe-
matics; he was fond of music and was himself a fair pianist. He 
no longer called the desert of Bentham peace when he fell under 
the influence of Wordsworth. Stephen is the man who never 
wrote below his best. Von Humboldt used to rail at bigotry 
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without religion, philosophy' without common sense, restheticism 
without culture. His service to the state, he said, was an 
apprenticeship to his service of science. He might have put it 
the other way, for I presume his service to science made him a 
better servant of the state, just as Morley's service to literature 
makes him a better statesman and his service to the state makes 
him a finer critic. "There is a view of culture" says Arnold, 
"in which all the love of our neighbours, the impulses toward ac-
tion, help, and beneficence, the desire for removing human error, 
clearing human confusion, and'diminishing human misery, the 
noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we 
found it-motives eminently such as are called social-come in as 
part of the grounds of culture, and the main and pre-eminent 
part. " Such motives are dominant in the men I have named; 
they explain their breadth of sympathy and their restless self-
forgetful inquiry, as contrasted with the selective, discriminative 
principle of the older ideal. 
EDWARD A. THURBER. 
University of Oregon. 
